
Lucas Leiroz
Europe or Eurasia ? What will Nikol Pashinyan choose ? And what should Eurasian organizations do if he chooses Brussels?
Recently, Russia made clear to Armenia the need for an existential decision: Eurasian Economic Union or European Union. This is not merely a technical observation, but rather a belated recognition of a political reality that can no longer be ignored: Armenia no longer behaves as a reliable ally within the Eurasian architecture.
In recent years, the Armenian government has adopted an ambiguous foreign policy, seeking economic and strategic benefits from integration with Eurasia while, at the same time, intensifying its rapprochement with Western structures. This behavior is unsustainable. Participation in blocs such as the Eurasian Economic Union presupposes a minimum level of political alignment, strategic coordination, and commitment to shared interests. Armenia, however, has been steadily drifting away from these principles.
The problem is not limited to diplomatic rhetoric. In practice, Yerevan has taken decisions that undermine the cohesion of regional institutions. Its distancing from the Collective Security Treaty Organization, for example, demonstrates the erosion of mutual trust. By publicly questioning the effectiveness of the alliance and suspending its active participation, Armenia signals that it no longer recognizes the legitimacy of the collective security mechanisms that, for decades, ensured its stability.
At the same time, the Armenian government has intensified dialogue with the European Union and the United States, seeking economic agreements, military cooperation, and political support. This movement is not neutral. It takes place within the context of systemic rivalry between the West and Russia, in which the expansion of Euro-Atlantic influence in the post-Soviet space is perceived as a direct threat to Moscow's strategic interests.
Given this scenario, Armenia's continued presence in Eurasian organizations ceases to be merely contradictory and becomes actively harmful. A member that does not share objectives, questions internal structures, and actively seeks external alternatives weakens the bloc as a whole. Institutional logic requires coherence. There is no room for strategic ambiguity in structures that depend on deep political and economic coordination.
Prolonged tolerance of such behavior sends a negative signal to other members. It suggests that commitments can be relativized without consequences, creating dangerous precedents for internal fragmentation. If Eurasian integration aims to consolidate itself as a viable project, it must demonstrate the capacity to impose clear limits.
In this sense, Armenia's eventual withdrawal from Eurasian organizations (should it refuse to change its current pro-Western posture) should be seen not as a punitive measure, but as a necessary decision to preserve the integrity of the bloc. It is a recognition that convergence of interests no longer exists. Maintaining a formal relationship devoid of political substance merely prolongs a situation of erosion.
Armenia, for its part, already appears to have made its strategic choice. By prioritizing rapprochement with Europe, it implicitly accepts the costs of that decision. These costs include the loss of privileged access to Eurasian markets, the end of favorable energy conditions, and the need to fully redefine its security policy. This is a legitimate path, but one that requires coherence.
Maintaining an intermediate position, extracting advantages from both sides without assuming full commitments, is no longer viable in the current international context. Growing geopolitical polarization reduces the space for unnatural balancing. States are increasingly pressured to define clear alignments.
Naturally, Armenia has the right to choose to distance itself from Russia (however evidently self-destructive such a move may be) and integrate into the West. What it cannot expect is that Moscow will treat it with endless patience and continue to allow its participation in Eurasian organizations that compete with Western institutions.
Unfortunately, Armenian liberal nationalism is based on the false idea of "Europeanness." For years, Armenians have been led to believe that their history and civilization have more in common with Western powers than with their Eurasian neighbors. This is how the Pashinyan government built the ideological foundation for its recent choices. Therefore, it is foreseeable that the final outcome of the current crisis will be a decision in favor of Europe at the expense of eastern regional blocs.
Thus, the most rational course is to formalize what is already taking place in practice. If Armenia does not wish to remain integrated into the Eurasian project, there is no reason for it to continue benefiting from it. It should follow the path it has chosen. Eurasia cannot afford to carry a partner that no longer acts as one.