Lorenzo Maria Pacini
Russia and the West are rapidly running out of room to manoeuvre to avoid a head-on military clash.
Russia and the West are rapidly running out of room to manoeuvre to avoid a head-on military clash.
For a few days now, we have been hearing about the 'permission' given by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to use ATACAMS missiles on Russian territory, almost as if the issue was permission to strike Russian territory, which is actually a non-issue, since Russian territory has been struck regularly for more than a year, mainly with drones. The patience of the Russians is well known and few people in the West realise that it may be coming to an end.
To understand the extent of the news one has to look at Putin's recent comment that, unlike drones, to use the high-precision ATACAMS missiles (1320 kg, up to 300 km range) one needs NATO satellite targeting systems and ground personnel trained to do so. Once again, Putin stated that this is a red line, defining NATO's direct participation in the war.
It is appropriate to reflect for a moment on the issue of 'red lines'.
Amidst a wave of reports that the U.S. and UK are ready to approve the use of Western missiles to strike Russian territory, Russian President Putin made his harshest comments to date, stating that the move would 'change the very nature of the conflict' and mean that NATO and Russia are 'in a state of war', warning that Russia would make 'appropriate decisions'.
In response, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer said: 'Russia started this conflict. Russia has illegally invaded Ukraine. Russia can end this conflict immediately. Ukraine has the right to self-defence'.
Let's be clear: this is an exquisitely political, international relations-related beat, certainly not a military 'fact', because in Russia as well as in the West, they are well aware that attacks on Russian territory have been going on for a long time and that the violation of territorial integrity and sovereignty is a fact; but diplomacy, which is still a balancing art, tries to remedy these troubles and offers solutions.
The military rationale for testing Russia's resolve in this matter is unclear. There is little reason to believe that the use of air-launched cruise missiles would significantly increase Ukraine's chances of winning a war of attrition in which the Russians have enormous advantages over Ukraine - and the West in general - in terms of population and military production. In particular:
- The Russians are undermining the Ukrainians' ability to send well-trained and equipped troops into combat, and air-launched cruise missiles will not change that;
- The issue of the 'red lines' not to be crossed is precisely at the origin of the so-called Special Military Operation, which depends on NATO's repeated defiance of the 'red lines' relating first to NATO's non-expansion to the east and then to Ukrainian non-neutrality;
- In fact, the best way to understand the current confrontation is to see it as a challenge to Russia, trying to bring it back to the subordination model of the Yeltsin years, preventing its expansion on a global scale;
- The Russians can adapt to the long-range strike capabilities of the Ukrainians because they have already adapted to the use of HIMARS artillery and ATACMS land-based missiles (and the Russians are still operating with the retired arsenal, not the new artillery). To have any real impact on Ukraine's ability to harm Russia, the West would have to supply a very large number of very long range missiles, far more than the small number of basic range models that would be considered, but the West's ability to supply such quantities is limited, and supplying them would almost inevitably provoke direct Russian retaliation.
Any red line violated without retaliation is experienced, and presented, as weakness on the part of the Russian government, and this game produces its real effects within Russia, whose original issue is its ability to exist unitedly as the huge multi-ethnic country that it is. Any sign of weakness in the central power opens the way for possible centrifugal movements within the country. Russia, like any other country, has its own power games within. There are few reasons to be optimistic that such attacks will push Putin to end the war or come to the negotiating table, but there are good reasons to fear that they will reinforce his claims that Russia is at war with NATO, not the Ukrainian people.
This is a key point to emphasise: Russia has continuously reiterated in all official and institutional fora that the conflict is not against the Ukrainian people, but against its coup government and the Atlanticist West that promoted and started this war, as early as 2014 (and even earlier). Russia has no interest in exterminating the Ukrainian population, which is ethnically and historically part of Russia's large multi-ethnic family.
Another potential unintended consequence is that the increasing lethality of Western military support will toughen Russia's demands in any future negotiations. The more the West shows that it is willing to use Ukraine to strike at Russia, the more the Russians will insist on a broad demilitarisation of Ukraine as a condition for a settlement.
At an early stage, this process did not lead for the West (i.e. the U.S.) to the desired outcomes. The idea was clear: once Putin takes the bait, and invades Ukraine, we, having trained the Ukrainian army to NATO standards for 8 years, will prove that it is a paper tiger; Western economic sanctions will strangle the Russian economy; the gap between the military and economic debacle will put the regime on the ropes, producing internal revolts and a systemic collapse.
However, this scenario did not materialise.
Militarily, the operation has become a war of position, a war of attrition. On the economic level, thanks mainly to the support of China, Russia was able to absorb the initial shock, regaining a new set-up of market flows, and immediately entered a new phase of economic prosperity on the international level. In terms of international relations, Russia was able to show the world what it means to deal with the West and started a process of global emancipation from the control of the Hegemon.
Militarily, the military situation in Ukraine is now critical for Western forces. The Kursk adventure was yet another red line violated, with the sole significance of producing an image damage to Putin's political leadership, but nothing more. In the central area of the front, the Russian army has now reached the third and last defensive line, beyond which there are no more fortified lines. The Ukrainian collapse seems to be a matter of a few months, probably destined to take place next spring.
Faced with this scenario, the entire Western ruling class, i.e. the American military-industrial complex and its European henchmen, know no Plan B. This is a huge mistake, as international politics dictates that one always has backup plans for various possible scenarios. This Western mistake carries enormous weight and few have yet realised it.
Those who command, the USA, can afford to violate any red line with virtual impunity: they know that Putin is by no means a madman who wants planetary destruction and will therefore not launch a direct attack on American soil. Those who obey, Europe, have already devastated their own production system and are in the front line for targeted attacks, including nuclear ones (remember that in current war doctrine, the use of tactical atomic bombs counts as ordinary warfare, not as the start of a nuclear war).
The U.S. is pushing for the violation of all red lines because it has two powerful expendable buffer zones: first Ukraine, then Europe.
It is in neither the West's nor Ukraine's interest to make it more difficult to reach an agreement that preserves Ukraine's independence and provides the opportunity for a prosperous future. What Ukraine desperately needs now is not long-range weapons, but a viable plan for a negotiated end to the war that gives Ukraine a real chance to rebuild.
Beware: Putin's Russia may still decide to respond militarily and demonstrate its superiority. Should this happen, the conflict would take place in the 'expendable zone' elected by the U.S., which is called Europe, leveraging Article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty, involving all European countries. And this is a reality, as harsh and violent as the carnage will be.
Here we are on the eve of yet another red line violation. Let's see how much the world is willing to risk.