Lorenzo Maria Pacini
According to U.S. military leaders, American armed forces may not have sufficient time for "China-style" wargaming.
Countering Chinese gray zone operations
The United States is fully aware that China-despite being fundamentally a land-based power-possesses high levels of specialization and operational presence at sea, especially within the proximal maritime sphere of the Chinese seas and the Pacific Ocean, where it plays a strategically significant role.
In seeking to counter Chinese presence, the U.S. continuously conducts Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) as part of a broader program intended to reaffirm rights of navigation and overflight across the globe. Originally established in 1979, this program integrates both diplomatic and operational instruments aimed at safeguarding the legality of maritime trade and ensuring the global mobility of U.S. forces, with particular emphasis on the South China Sea. Although not conceived specifically as a tool to counter gray zone activities, numerous analysts and interviewed officials highlight its centrality in addressing China's strategy, which is based on a distinct assertion and interpretation of maritime rights in an area that is geographically adjacent to the Chinese mainland yet lies on the opposite side of the globe for the United States.
From the American perspective, freedom of navigation is comparable to a form of "right of way" in English common law, and remains valid only insofar as navigators actively exercise it. Should such rights fall into disuse, they may progressively weaken, effectively restoring authority to the coastal state. Each year, the United States releases an official report identifying states responsible for excessive maritime claims against which the U.S. Navy has conducted transit operations in defense of navigation rights. Although these reports specify the maritime areas concerned, they do not disclose the frequency of individual operations.
In 2022- the most recent year for which data are available-Washington conducted FONOPs against 22 different excessive claims advanced by 15 states. A FOIA request submitted by the Congressional Research Service revealed that between 2017 and 2020 the U.S. Navy carried out a total of 54 FONOPs to contest Chinese claims in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. During that period, the number of operations increased from six to eight in the South China Sea and from three to thirteen in the Taiwan Strait (no public data are available for 2021-2023). Generally, the United States does not announce each individual operation, and most FONOPs occur without press releases. Nevertheless, Washington has occasionally chosen to publicize certain operations conducted against Chinese maritime claims deemed illegitimate-often following public criticism from Beijing.
Maritime counterinsurgency
Through these actions, the United States has sought to counter Chinese operations by employing more sustained forms of maritime presence, relying on the justification of "defending" regional partners. The most notable episode is the so-called "West Capella incident," when units of the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) harassed the drilling vessel West Capella, operating within Malaysia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) between late 2019 and early 2020.
In response, in April 2020 the United States deployed the amphibious assault ship USS America and two escort vessels from the 7th Fleet strike group. The USS America remained in the area for several days, followed by the Littoral Combat Ships Gabrielle Giffords and Montgomery, which continued patrols for several weeks. The operation was accompanied by public statements from the commanders of the Pacific Fleet, the 7th Fleet, and Task Force 76, reaffirming Malaysia's right to explore natural resources within its EEZ. Chinese pressure subsided, and Kuala Lumpur was able to continue its drilling activities without further interference.
The episode has been widely regarded as both an operational and political success-so much so that Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro described it as an "extraordinary prototype" of a new approach aimed at supporting regional partners in the face of China's "coercive maritime insurgency" in the South China Sea. The operation has been linked to subsequent developments, such as Indonesia's large-scale naval exercise, the Philippines' initiation of maritime arbitration proceedings against China, and Malaysia's decision to formally contest Beijing's claims at the United Nations.
This is a textbook example of gray zone activity. Its significance lies less in the operational details-merely one incident among many-and more in the media narrative the United States constructed, presenting the event as an international success. One year earlier, maritime strategist Hunter Stires had published an essay proposing the application of COIN (counterinsurgency) theory to Chinese gray zone operations. According to Stires, China is waging a form of "political insurgency" aimed at establishing de facto jurisdiction over disputed waters, mirroring territorial control dynamics typical of guerrilla warfare. Unlike FONOPs-which Stires compares to the "search and destroy" missions of the Vietnam War, temporarily effective yet unable to prevent the adversary from reoccupying territory-the COIN approach would imply a continuous, integrated presence alongside local forces, modeled on the Marine Corps' Combined Action Program in Vietnam. It is noteworthy that after the West Capella incident, Washington continued to support certain maritime operations of regional partners, albeit in a limited fashion.
Not so simple
The reality is that FONOPs and overflights are useful tools for countering Chinese gray zone operations, but they are largely insufficient on their own. They primarily protect the rights of foreign military vessels without providing substantial benefits to Southeast Asian states, which continue to experience the gradual erosion of their sovereign and economic rights in regional waters.
This is why American information warfare is more important in this historical phase of gray zone competition than conventional operations. Particularly under the current Trump administration, psychological and informational impact constitute indispensable precursors to conventional activity. In practice, the United States has not directly replicated the West Capella model in subsequent gray zone confrontations, even though the concept of maritime counterinsurgency has been explored in Pentagon exercises and simulations. However, the renewed orientation of U.S. national security strategy toward great-power competition-emphasizing preparation for high-intensity conflict with China-may hinder the adoption of a COIN paradigm, not least because of past U.S. failures in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Vietnam.
Multiple obstacles continue to impede the implementation of a maritime COIN approach. First, there are issues of regional politics: Southeast Asian states must be both willing and capable of participating in such initiatives. Second, the political perception of the U.S. role must be considered; some governments, such as the Philippines, prefer to maintain autonomous leadership over their strategies to counter Chinese coercion, pushing Washington to adopt a more discreet posture. Finally, there is the ever-present risk of escalation: an integrated maritime presence would heighten the likelihood of incidents between U.S. and Chinese vessels. If regional partners' ships operating with U.S. support were struck or damaged, questions would arise regarding the degree of protection the United States would be obliged to provide, potentially triggering unintended escalation.
Concerns about a possible direct (and conventional) conflict with China pose an additional constraint: Taiwan. According to American military analysts, the island could be "invaded by 2027." This prospect drives U.S. command authorities to prioritize operational lines aimed at ensuring the ability to fight within the first island chain through information superiority and advanced kinetic capabilities. While these efforts include countering gray zone activities, the overarching strategy remains primarily oriented toward deterrence and preparation for armed conflict.
For its part, China is pursuing a "dual-track" strategy: preparing for the possibility of war while simultaneously seeking to "win without fighting" through the progressive consolidation of maritime control.
According to U.S. military leaders, American armed forces may not have sufficient time for "China-style" wargaming.